Category Archives: novelty

Res Ipsa Loquitur

It seems that appellant consumed one plug of his purchase, which measured up to representations, that it was tobacco unmixed with human flesh, but when appellant tackled the second plug it made him sick, but, not suspecting the tobacco, he tried another chew, and still another, until he bit into some foreign substance, which crumbled like dry bread, and caused him to foam at the mouth, while he was getting “sicker and sicker.” Finally, his teeth struck something hard; he could not bite through it. After an examination he discovered a human toe, with flesh and nail intact. We refrain from detailing the further harrowing and nauseating details.

The thing, truly does, speak for itself.

Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490 (1918).

Overheard in Bar Review

“Kid puts on flammable pajamas, jumps in bed and lights a cigar — he goes up like a roman candle.”

The Time Sen. Ernie Chambers Took on God and Lost

There has been much written on former Nebraska Senator Ernie Chambers’ lawsuit against God. It began as a protest of frivolous lawsuits and then became one on its own. A particularly delightful passage:

Defendant directly and proximately has caused, inter alia, fearsome floods, egregious earthquakes, horrendous hurricanes, terrifying tornadoes, pestilent plagues, ferocious famines, devastating droughts, genocidal wars, birth defects and the like.

The case was finally discharged in 2008 when the Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and vacated the order of the district court, holding “a court decides real controversies and determines rights actually controverted, and does not address or dispose of abstract questions or issues that might arise in hypothetical or fictitious situation or setting.”

Plaintiff’s complaint Chambers v. God (2007).

Overheard in Bar Review

Let’s start with a typical unilateral contract, a reward contract. I put up a poster for my lost dog it says, “$50 reward for return of lost dog: three legs, one eye, half a tail, answers to Lucky…”

The Time Gerald Mayo Took on Satan and His Minions and Lost

In his lawsuit, Gerald Mayo alleged that “Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and unwarranted threats, against the will of plaintiff, that Satan has placed deliberate obstacles in his path and has caused plaintiff’s downfall. Plaintiff alleges that by reason of these acts Satan has deprived him of his constitutional rights.”

Plaintiff, alleging jurisdiction under various federal statutes prayed for leave to file a complaint for violation of his civil rights in forma pauperis (waiving filing fees as that of a pauper). Not only does Mayo want to file this suit, he doesn’t want to pay for it.

The Western District of Pennsylvania Court, lead by District Judge Webber, denied plaintiff’s prayer on numerous grounds:

1) There were serious doubts that the complaint revealed a cause of action upon which relief could be granted by the court.

2) The court questioned whether plaintiff may obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this judicial district, stating: “The complaint contains no allegation of residence in this district. While the official reports disclose no case where this defendant has appeared as defendant there is an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where this defendant filed an action of mortgage foreclosure as plaintiff. The defendant in that action was represented by the preeminent advocate of that day, and raised the defense that the plaintiff was a foreign prince with no standing to sue in an American Court.” Note the nod to The Devil and Daniel Webster.

3) While this suit is appropriate for class action status, there are numerous mechanical problems.

4) The court noted that the plaintiff has failed to include with his complaint the required form of instructions for the United States Marshal for directions as to service of process.

U. S. ex rel. Mayo v. Satan and his Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971).

Footnotes that Bite

Judge Thompson of the California Court of Appeals, like Gov. Schwarzenegger’s office, knows how to hide a slight in an acronym.

We feel compelled by the nature of the attack in the dissenting opinion to spell out a response:

1. Some answer is required to the dissent’s charge.

2. Certainly we do not endorse “victimless crime.”

3. How that question is involved escapes us.

4. Moreover, the constitutional issue is significant.

5. Ultimately it must be addressed in light of precedent.

6. Certainly the course of precedent is clear.

7. Knowing that, our result is compelled. (See Funk & Wagnall’s The New Cassell’s German Dict., p. 408, in conjunction with fn. 6 of dis. opn. of Douglas, J., in Ginsberg v. New York (1967) 390 U.S. 629, 655-656 [20 L.Ed.2d 195, 212-213, 88 S.Ct. 1274].)

People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, fn 2 (1979).

The Misfits – Where Eagles Dare

“Defendant, seeing plaintiff on a city street, reviled her at the top of his lungs in the presence of bystanders and others who assembled, calling her a God damned son of a bitch, a dirty crook, and other similar epithets, which he repeated several times. Plaintiff was seven months pregnant at the time, and her condition was sufficiently obvious to the defendant; and she claimed that the verbal attack was made for the purpose of causing her physical injury.”

Bartow v. Smith, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948) cited in Prosser’s Insult and Outrage (1956).

The Misfits – Where Eagles Dare.

Improper Grounds for Seeking Default Judgment

The plaintiff in this suit sought an entry of a default judgment against the defendant for having failed to plead or otherwise defend the action. However, the fact of the matter was that the defendant had answered the plaintiff’s complaint in the following manner:

Not only do I deny all of the allegation in the above styled suit, I contend, with all due respect, that the plaintiff must be suffering from a condition of brown eyeballs since he is full of so much bullshit.

The court on review held, “While the form and language of the appellant’s response are less than desirable and more frank than customary, the appellant did state in short and plain terms his general denial of appellees’ claims.”

Wheat v. Eakin, 491 So. 2d 523 (1986).