Urban Dictionary Finds Place in Official Court Opinions


What once was restricted to Wikipedia, the scholarly source, has now extended to a research tool with potentially less integrity. In a recent piece, the New York Times reports on the growing use of urbandictionary.com as a dictionary of slang and colloquialisms legitimate enough for reference in official court opinions. As official, print dictionaries like Websters and the OED lag behind the parlance of our times, Urban Dictionary maintains an up to date, peer-reviewed list of common words.

Uses of Urban Dictionary, started in 1999 by founder Aaron Peckham from his college dorm, include last month’s Wisconsin opinion where the court sought to determine what was meant by two suspected robbers who referred to themselves as the “jack boys.” A court in Tennessee sought to define what a manager accused of sexual harassment by an employee meant when using the phrase “to nut.”

Prior to the inception of Urban Dictionary, courts would hire linguists to conduct surveys of the population to determine what was meant by a slang term, not found in any traditional dictionary. Now, anyone can provide a definition for a word, whether original or not, which must be approved by five other site users before appearing on the site.

While Rutgers law professor Greg Lastowka anticipates that the use of Urban Dictionary will become more prevalent, Peckham points to the inherent problem with using his site as a traditional dictionary:

[P]rivate analyses the site has conducted show that “funny” is the No. 1 reason people give for voting for posts.

Whether courts will take into account the demographics of the users of the site or that anyone and four of their friends can skew results remains to be seen. YOLO.

Via NYTimes.

Stream of Slurs, Threats Not Protected Under Constitution


The SF Chronicle reported this weekend on a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in San Diego affirming that loud, angry, aggressive, and disruptive language is not constitutionally protected speech.

The case, In re Curtis S. (2013) Cal. Super. Ct. No. JCM230237, came on appeal after a conviction in juvenile court of three counts:  1) petty theft (Pen. Code,  § 484); 2) assault (§ 240); and 3) disturbing another person by loud and unreasonable noise (§ 415, subd. (2)). Testimony revealed that Curtis S., a minor, stole a cell phone from another student and was pursued by a good Samaritan who stopped her car in front of Curtis S., preventing him from getting away. He threw the phone into a construction site and then began yelling obscenities and threatening language at the woman. When she attempted to grab his arm to detain him, he swung at her with a closed fist. According to testimony, Curtis S. called someone on his own cell phone during the altercation and said, “you better get this lady, because I’m about to.” Police arrived and arrested Curtis S. for the theft and for threatening the woman.

On appeal, Curtis S. argued that the purpose of his speech was to communicate and that such speech was protected by the First Amendment. Section 415, subdivision (2) makes it a crime for any person to “maliciously and willfully disturb[] another person by loud and unreasonable noise.” The appellate court relying on In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 621, found that creating a disturbance by making loud noises, shouting obscenities, and making threats verbally is not protected speech.

Further, the Supreme Court has recognized, “the protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and . . . the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”  (Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 358.)  Words may be restricted under the First Amendment where they are ” ‘ “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” ‘ ”  (Id. at pp. 358-359, citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 382-383.)

In California, when is speech not protected? When it communicates nothing!

“The loud shouting of obscenities and threats was disruptive, rather than communicative in nature.”

Via SF Chronicle.

Read the opinion.

Appellate Court Affirms: Sidewalk a Deadly Weapon

“[W]hether the pitcher hits the stone or the stone hits the pitcher, it will be bad for the pitcher.” Cervantes, Don Quixote

The Second Appellate District upheld the conviction of J.L., a 14-year-old boy charged with assault with a deadly weapon after he stomped on another boy laying on the sidewalk. J.L. appealed his trial court conviction on the grounds that just as hands and feet cannot be deadly weapons (the California Supreme Court has said a deadly weapon must be extrinsic of the body), because he did not “use” the sidewalk to assault his victim, the court could not convict him of assault with a deadly weapon.

“Not so!” affirmed the Appellate court. As in People v. Russell, where the Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon when he pushed his victim in front of a moving car, a defendant need not wield the deadly weapon in order to use it. The key is that the assailant takes advantage of a stationary object’s intrinsic qualities in way to cause a victim great bodily harm.

Via FindLaw.

Read the opinion.

Affordable Care Act Winning 3-2

On Tuesday another Federal District judge upheld the Affordable Care Act of 2010 against charges that Congress acted outside its commerce clause powers. This brings the five-ruling total to three rulings in favor of the laws constitutionality and two rulings against.

In other news, the Justice Department has effectively extended federal benefits to same-sex couples, after President Obama declared the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional.

From the NY Times.

Read Judge Kessler’s 02/22/11 opinion upholding Obamacare (Congress acting within commerce clause powers).

Is the Health Care Law Unconstitutional?

“Under the Due Process Clause, no Supreme Court decision since 1935 has struck down any state or federal legislation for infringing economic liberties, and any such action would be radically inconsistent with current constitutional doctrine.” –Professor Mark Hall of Wake Forest Law School

Prof. Hall is referring to the last statute to be struck down under the 5th or the 14th amendments, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935). Two years later, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’ authority under the commerce clause in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937). In that case, Congress sought to set a minimum wage for women which the Plaintiff claimed went beyond the regulatory power given to Congress by the commerce clause, which provides that Congress may pass any law so long as it is regulating economic activity interstate commerce.

The question of the day is whether it is within Congress’ authority to pass a law which, in part, requires U.S. citizens to purchase health insurance under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Odds are it will. Recent cases where the Supreme Court ruled Congress overstepped it’s authority include U.S. v. Lopez (a guns near schools case) and U.S. v. Morrison (striking down the Violence Against Women Act as not affecting interstate commerce). The difference in those two cases was drawing a connection between the legislation’s effect and economic activity was tenuous at best, something the Court was unwilling to stomach.

Here, though, requiring citizens to purchase health care is clearly within the scope of the commerce clause as it clearly affects interstate commerce. Similarly, requiring South Dakota residents to own guns also affects interstate commerce. The difference? Rep. Hal Wick is proving his point backwards.

Via the NY Times.

Read Judge Steeh’s 10/7/10 opinion upholding Obamacare (Congress acting within commerce clause powers).

Read Judge Moon’s 11/13/10 opinion upholding Obamacare (Congress acting within commerce clause powers).

Read Judge Hudson’s 12/13/10 opinion excising Obamacare in part (Congress exceeded regulatory powers under commerce clause).

Read Judge Vinson’s 1/31/11 opinion striking down Obamacare in whole (Congress exceeded regulatory powers under commerce clause).

“To The University of Southern California known as The U.C.L.A.”

What happens when a testatrix’s will has the sort of ambiguity implicating one of the greatest sports rivalries in the US? Litigation! Litigation involving USC, the UC Regents, and the heirs of Cora L. Black. Ms. Black executed the following holographic will:

“Los Gatos, California May 2nd 1957

“I, Cora L. Black, Being of sound and disposing mind and Memory make this My last Will and Testament. I cancel all Other Wills made by me.

“To The University of Southern California known as The U.C.L.A.  My entire Estate for Educational purposes.

“My Estate consists of Stocks bonds

“The house in which I live is to be sold and the money shall be part of The Estate. All monthly bills shall be paid by The Bank of California Who are to administar [sic] This Estate.

“If any claims are made by relatives They are to be given one dollar.

“Signed by me This Second day of May 1957.


The trial court, in a dramatic re-reading of Black’s will held that there was no latent ambiguity in this devise. Rather, the lower court eliminated one of the beneficiaries, USC, and interpreted “The University of Southern California” to mean “the university in Southern California.” Further, the court believed the capitalization of the word “University” was of no significance because people sometimes capitalize the word and on other occasions they do not. Ultimately, the court awarded the entirety of Black’s estate to UCLA, leaving USC and the surviving heirs out in the cold.

As a rule in the law of Wills, a very central rule, a court is not at liberty to read the language of a will with anything other than its plain, ordinary meaning. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed, sending the case back to the trial court to admit parol evidence in order to determine what exactly was meant by the phrase “To The University of Southern California known as The U.C.L.A.”

Estate of Black, 211 Cal. App. 2d 75 (1962).

CLS’s “Unrepentant Participation in or Advocacy of a Sexually Immoral Lifestyle” Discrimination Won’t Wash at Hastings

The Christian Legal Society of UC Hastings seeking to discriminate against homosexual members took their case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court via Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010). And in a 5-to-4 decision handed down today, they lost.

In requiring CLS — in common with all other student organizations — to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations. . . CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings’ policy.

From the SF Chron.

Also news today: guns guaranteed everywhere!